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This paper characterizes endogenous monetary policy when policymakers are uncertain
about the extent to which movements in output and ination are due to changes in potential
output or to cyclical demand and cost shocks. We refer to this informational limitation as the
“information problem” (IP). Main results of the paper are: 1. Policy is likely to be excessively
loose (restrictive) for some time when there is a large decrease (increase) in potential output in
comparison with a full information benchmark. 2. Errors in forecasting potential output and
theoutputgap aregenerallyseriallycorrelated. These ndingsprovideapartial explanation for
theinationoftheseventiesandthepricestabilityofthenineties. 3. Aquantitativeassessment,
based on an empirical model of the US economy developed by Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999), indicates that during and following periods of large changes in potential output the
IP signicantly affects the dynamics of ination and output. 4. The increase in the Fed’s
conservativeness between the seventies and the nineties, and a more realistic appreciation of
the uncertainties surrounding potential output in the second period, imply that the IP problem
had a stronger impact in the seventies than in the nineties.
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A stabilizing role for monetary policy hinges on some notion of “potential output”, a non-
observable economic variable representing the desirable level at which actual output should
be. The conduct of monetary policy therefore requires that the central bank estimates and
continuallyupdate, itsmeasureofpotentialoutput. Kuttner(1992, 1994)wasamong therstto
raise the issue of the quantitative importance of uncertainty about potential output for real-time
policymaking. He examined the difculties inherent in real-time estimation of potential output
and suggested that situations requiring policy actions might not be immediately recognizable
because of signal extraction errors arising under imperfect information.
This point of view ts surprisingly well the persistent downward revisions of estimates of
potential output in the US during the latter part of the seventies. Enlightening documentation
on the recurrent ex-post downward revisions of perceived potential output appears in the 1979
Economic Report of the President (pp. 72-76.). In particular, Chart 7 (shown below) vividly
illustrates the magnitude and persistence of this process.
Figure 1 - Reprint from “Economic Report of the President (1979)”.
This policy implication is central for Orphanides (2000a,b, 2001), who reports evidence of a
signicant (real time) overestimation of potential output during the oil shocks of the seventies.
By leading to a monetary policy stance which turned out to be excessively loose with the
benet of hindsight, Orphanides argues, this overestimation aggravated ination at the time.
4 Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the December 2001 NBER conference on“Macroeconomic
policy in a dynamic, uncertain economy”, at the Bank of Italy, Federal Reserve Board, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements and at the Central European University. We benetted from extremely useful discussions with
Athanasios Orphanides and from comments by Simon Gilchrist and David Small.10
Somewhat symmetrically, the strong productivity gains recorded in the United States during
the second half of the 1990s raise the possibility that the greater-than-expected increases in
potential output may have allowed a less restrictive monetary policy stance than that initially
implied by real time estimates of ination and the output gap.
The hypothesized relevance of imperfect information may shed new light on monetary policy
“errors” during the seventies and raises an important question about the extent to which such
retrospective policy mistakes can be avoided in the future. If the errors were due to poor
forecasting procedures or to an inefcient specication of the “policy rule”, a likely answer to
this question is yes. But if, given the available real time information policy was as efcient as
possible, the likely answer is no. Assessing the extent to which retrospective policy mistakes
are due to “bad policies” rather than to “bad luck” requires a model which identies optimal
monetary policy underimperfectinformation. Theavailability ofsuchabenchmarkisessential
forevaluatingtheextent to which(retrospective)policyerrors wereavoidableinrealtime. This
paper makes a step in this direction by proposing such a benchmark model and analyzing its
properties.
The paper shows that, given the structure of information, some policy decisions that are judged
ex-post to be mistakes may be unavoidable even if the central bank uses the best forecasting
procedures in “real time”. These retrospective mistakes are normally small during periods in
which changes in potential output are small. But during periods characterized by unusually
large changes in the long run level of output, policy “mistakes” in a given direction are likely
to be large and to persist for some time. These claims are established in an environment where
the central bank cannot perfectly distinguish (even ex post) between changes in ination and
output that are due to changes in potential output and those that are due to higher frequency
changes in demand and costs. We label this inevitable confusion between demand and cost
shocks, on one hand, and shocks to potential output, on the other, as an “information problem”
(IP in brief).
2
5 The macroeconomic consequences of a similar confusion were discussed following the oil shocks of the
seventies within frameworks in which monetary policy is exogenous (Brunner, Cukierman and Meltzer (1980),
Part II of Cukierman (1984) and Chapter 4 of Brunner and Meltzer (1993)). This earlier literature referred to
the inability to perfectly distinguish between permanent and transitory shocks to productivity as a “permanent -
transitory” confusion.11
Theevidencein Orphanides (2001)supportstheviewthat monetary policyduring theseventies
was excessively loose since a reduction in potential output was interpreted for some time
as a negative output gap. The analytical framework of this paper provides an “optimizing”
analytical foundationforthismechanismandidentiestheconditions underwhichit operates.
3
Interestingly, a large permanent decrease in potential output does not lead to an excessively
loose and persistent policy stance under all circumstances. Whether it does or not depends
on the relative persistence of demand and cost shocks, the degree of conservativeness of the
central bank and the relative size of the variance of innovations to potential output.
The results above are developed within a simple macroeconomic model that underlies many
central banks’ idea of the monetary policy transmission process.
4 The paper identies
conditions under which the the IP leads monetary policy to be 		 looser than under
perfect information inperiodsoflargereductionsinpotential outputand tobeoverlyrestrictive
relative to this benchmark in periods of large expansions in potential output. The reason is
that, even when they lter available information in an optimal manner, policymakers as well
as the public at large detect changes in potential output only 

		. When there is a large
decrease in potential output, as was the case in the seventies, policymakers interpret part of this
reduction as a negative output gap and loosen monetary policy too much in comparison to a
no IP benchmark. Thus, in periods of large decreases in potential output, ination accelerates
partly because of the relatively expansionary monetary policy stance. Conversely, when 
as may have happened in the US during the nineties  a “new economy” raises the level of
potential output, ination subsides partly because policy makers interpret some of the increase
in output as a positive output gap, so that policy is tighter than under perfect information.
A main novel result of the paper is that, even when the information available to policymakers
in real time is used efciently and monetary policy chosen optimally, the forecast errors in real
time estimates of potential output and of the output gap are serially correlated retrospectively.
6 Related work in which potential output is specied as a Hodrick-Prescott lter appears in Lansing (2000).
Two differences between our paper and that of Lansing are that we derive the forecast of potential output from
the stochastic structure of the economy and the policy rule from the loss function of policymakers. By contrast,
Lansing postulates both of those concepts exogenously. The paper by Swanson (2000) is nearer to our framework
in that it features optimizing policymakers and species the estimation of potential output as a signal extraction
problem. But his main point is that, in spite of quadratic objectives, the optimal policy rule depends on the
variances of shocks via the solution to the signal extraction problem, whereas we focus on the implications of
such a framework for optimal interest rate policy and for the associated retrospective “policy errors”.
7 It is a compact formulation of the economic structure that appears in Svensson (1997).12
In general, this serial correlation is induced by shocks to potential output, as well as to the
cyclical components of output. The paper identies conditions under which the bulk of the
serial correlation is due to shocks to potential output. In particular, it shows that, when the
variance of shocks to potential output is relatively small, most of the serial correlation is due
to innovations to potential output. Interestingly, retrospective evidence about forecast errors
in potential output during the seventies and the eighties are consistent with these implications
(Orphanides, 2000a). As a consequence of the serial correlation in those errors monetary
policy also appears in retrospect to be systematically biased in one direction.
In summary the paper provides a unied framework for understanding some of the reasons
for both the ination of the seventies and the remarkable price stability of the nineties. It
illustrates how the speed of learning by policymakers and the deviations of policy from an
ideal full-information-benchmark depend on the stochastic structure of various economic
shocks. Identication of such conditions is a necessary rst step for gauging empirically
whether imperfect information is quantitatively important in determining of monetary policy
and ination. In Section 5 we make a rst step in this direction by using the economic
structure estimated by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) to obtain a preliminary estimate of
the quantitative impact of the IP problem under optimal monetary policy and optimal ltering.
Finally, the paper argues that it is likely that the IP problem was less important during the
nineties than during the seventies for two reasons. First, the Fed was more conservative in the
nineties. Second, both the economic profession and the Fed had a more realistic evaluation of
the uncertainties surrounding potential output in the nineties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of endogenous monetary
policy in the presence of imperfect information about the origins of uctuations in output and
characterizes optimal monetary policy in this environment. The consequences for the behavior
of real interest rates, ination and the output gap in comparison to their full information
counterparts are analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 develops the real-time optimal forecast
of potential output and shows that forecast errors of real time estimates of potential output
and of the output gap are serially correlated. Section 5 uses an empirical model of the US
economy, proposed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), to provide a preliminary quantitative
assessment of the effects of imperfect information. Section 6 discusses reasons supporting the13
view that retrospective policy errors were smaller during the nineties than during the seventies.
This is followed by concluding remarks.
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This section presents a simplied version of a backward looking sticky-price model similar
to those in Svensson (1997) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). Despite the model’s
simplicity, it is likely to capture key elements of the views of major central banks about the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.
5 Its main advantage is that it illustrates analytically
some basic consequences of imperfect information in a relatively simple manner. The main
qualitative effects described in the analytical sections of the paper also appear in richer models,
featuring transmission lags (as in the Rudebusch Svensson model considered in Section 5.1)
and forward-looking variables (as in Ehrmann and Smets (2001) and Gerali and Lippi, [2002]).
2.1  
In this framework (the logarithm of) output (|)a n di n ation (|) are determined, respectively,
as follows:
|  |  |  | (1)
|  |  ||	 (2)
Here | denotes (the log of) potential output as of period 
, | is a 	 short term interest rate,
| is a demand shock and | a cost-push shock. This framework postulates that potential output
 is a fundamental long run determinant of actual output. But actual output is also affected by
a demand shock and by the real rate of interest, which for given inationary expectations, is
determined in turn by the (nominal) interest rate policy of the central bank.
We assume the economy is subject to two types of temporary but persistent shocks and to
a permanent shock to the level of potential output. The temporary shocks are the aggregate
demand shock, |, and the cost-push shock, |. In line with conventional macroeconomic
wisdom we postulate that the demand and cost shocks are less persistent than changes in
potential output which are affected by long run factors such as technology and physical
8 Mishkin’s (1999) commenton Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) elaborates on how such a relatively simple
model is useful for monetary policy makers.14
and human capital formation.
6 The persistence of shocks to potential output is modeled by
assuming that | is a random walk.
7 More specically we postulate the following stochastic
processes for the shocks:
|  |3￿  |   (3)
|  
|3￿  |  
 (4)
|  |3￿  | (5)
where the innovations  |  | and  | are uncorrelated, have zero means and respective standard
deviations } ￿ and 5.
2.2  	
Policy is described by the choice of the short term real rate, |, made possible by the
















where |  || denotes the output gap (dened as the difference between the logs of actual
and of potential output) and |3￿ is the information set available at the beginning of period 
,





Here |￿|3￿ and |￿|3￿ are the expected values of ination and of the output gap conditional on
the information available at the beginning of period 
: |3￿	 At this stage we note that |3￿
contains, among other data, observations on actual ination and output up to and including
period 
  .Af u l ls p e c i cation of |3￿ appears below. Since period 
 values of ination and
of the output gap are not known with certainty at the beginning of period 
,t h e s ev a r i a b l e s
(which are indirectly controlled by policy) appear in equation (7) in expected terms.
9 The notion that demand shocks are relatively less persistent than shocks to potential output underlies the
empirical identication of demand and supply factors in Blanchard and Quah (1989).
: Nothing in our results would change if we had added a deterministic trend growth to the potential output
process.15
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Theinterestraterulein(8)ledbyoneperiodimpliesthattheoptimalrealinterestratepolicyfor
period
 |n￿requires thepolicymakertoformexpectations aboutthevaluesofthedemand
shock and the cost push shocks, |n￿ and |n￿. Although he does not observe those shocks
directly, the policymaker possesses information about economic variables from which noisy,
but optimal, forecasts of the shocks can be derived. In particular, we assume that policymakers









but do not know the
precise stochastic sources of uctuations in output and ination.
Thus, when the interest rate |n￿ is chosen at the beginning of period 
   the policymaker
formsexpectationsabout|n￿ and|n￿ usinghistoricaldata. Thelatterconsistsofobservations
on output and inationup to andincludingperiod 
. The information available at the beginning
of period 
 is summarized by the information set
|  	 |3￿ |3￿c    			 (11)
which is used to form the conditional expectations: |n￿￿| and |n￿￿|. Past observations
on output and ination are equivalent to past observations on the two signals, ￿c| and 2c|
(obtained by rearranging (9) and (10)):
￿c|  |  |￿|3￿ 

  
2|￿|3￿  |  | (12)




2|￿|3￿  |  | (13)16
where variables to the left of the equality sign are observed separately while those to the right
are not.
8 Clearly, ￿c| and 2c| contain (noisy) information on | and | which can be used to
make inference on |n￿ and |n￿, using the fact that |n￿￿|  |￿| and |n￿￿|  
|￿|.
The optimal estimates of | and | conditional on | (|￿| and |￿|) follow immediately from
the two signals (12) and (13), once the optimal estimate of potential output, |￿| is known.
9
Therefore, the signal extraction (or ltering) problem solved by the policymaker reduces to an
inference problem concerning the level of potential output.
2.4 
  	 

  	  
    

Let policy makers’ forecast errors concerning the variables | | | conditional on the
information set | be:

 |￿|  |  |￿| (14)

 |￿|  |  |￿| (15)

 |￿|  |  |￿| (16)
Using (12) and (13) the following useful relationship between these errors can be derived :

 |￿|  
 |￿| 
 |￿|	 (17)
The last equation shows that overestimation of potential output (
 |￿|  ) simultaneously
	 an overestimation of the cost-push shock and an underestimation of the demand
shock.
10 This is summarized in the following remark.
Remark 1 	 

  
 |￿|  |  |￿|     	    
; In particular, the construction of the signals, 4w and 5w needed for the formation of the forecasts w.4mw,
w.4mw and w.4mw utilizes the previous period forecasts wmw￿4 and wmw￿4, which are known at the beginning of
period   .
< This follows from the fact that: wmw  4>w  wmw and wmw  5>w  4>w  wmw
43 This can be seen immediately by rewriting the expressions for the estimates of  and  as
wmw  w   wmw (18)
wmw  w   wmw (19)17
   
 
 |￿|  |  |￿|  
 
   
 |￿|  |  |￿|  
 
	   
 	  
 |￿|  !
The intuition underlying this result can be understood by referring to equations (12) and (13).
The rst equation implies that an increase in ￿c| is always and optimally interpreted as being
due partly to an increase in |and partly to an increase in |. Similarly, an increase in 2c| is
interpreted as being partly due to an increase in |a n dp a r t l yt oa ni n c r e a s ei n|. Thus, when
only | increases, part of this increase is interpreted as an increase in potential output, but the
remainder is interpreted as an increase in |. As a consequence the error in forecasting | is
positiveandtheerrorinforecasting| is negative, producing anegativecorrelationbetween the
forecast errors in those two variables. Since 2c| does not change the (erroneously) perceived
increase in | is interpreted as a decrease in |, producing a positive forecast error for this
variable, and therefore, a positive correlation between the forecast errors in | and in |.
+ ,! * *  " '"( !'! * %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."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Remark 1 shows how mismeasurement of potential output distorts policymakers’ perceptions
of cyclical conditions (cost-push and demand shocks). The purpose of this section is to answer
the following question: How do such noisy perceptions of the cycle affect monetary policy,
ination and the output gap? We proceed by comparing the values of those variables in the
presence of imperfect information with their values under a full information benchmark. In the
benchmark case policymakers possess in each period   about the realizations
of the shocks up to and including the previous period by assumption. Formally, under perfect
information at the beginning of period 





|  | |3￿ |3￿ |3￿    				 (20)
3.1 " 
   	
We begin by studying the determinants of the difference between the settings of monetary
policy in the presence and in the absence of the IP. Using equations (8), (18), (19) and (17),18
the  of the optimal interest rate in the presence of the IP from its optimal value under









) can be written as





















It follows immediately from (21) that if demand shocks are sufciently persistent in
comparison to cost shocks (i.e. 
4b2
knb2) the deviation of the real interest rate from its
full information counterpart moves in the same direction as the forecast error in potential
output (
 |￿|). Although one cannot rule out the possibility that, when the persistence in cost
shocks is sufciently larger than that of demand shocks, the opposite occurs, it appears that
the rst case seems more likely a-priori. The reason is that the persistence parameter of the
cost shocks is multiplied by a fraction implying that |n￿ and 
 |￿| are positively related even
if 
 is larger than , but not by too much. Note that the smaller the (Rogoff (1985) type)
conservativeness of the central bank (the higher  the more likely it is that |n￿ and 
 |￿|
are positively related even when 
 is larger than . Hence, for central banks which are (using
Svensson’s (1997) terminology) relatively exible ination targeters the case in which |n￿
and 
 |￿| are positively related is denitely the more likely one for most or all values of 
 and 
in the range between zero and one. The various possible effects of imperfect information are
summarized in the following proposition:
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To understand the intuition underlying the proposition it is useful to consider the case in
w h i c ht h e r ei s ,i np e r i o d
, a negative shock to potential output and no changes in the cyclical
shocks,  and 	 This leads, as of the beginning of period 
  , to overestimation of potential
output in period 
 (
 |￿|  . Remark 1 implies that this overestimation is associated with an
overestimation of the cost shock and an underestimation of the demand shock of period 
.
The policy chosen at the beginning of period 
 aims to offset the (presumed) deationary
impact of the demand shock on the output gap and the (presumed) inationary impact of the
cost shock on ination. In comparison to the full information benchmark, the rst objective
pushes policy towards expansionism while the second pushes it towards restrictiveness. If
demand shocks are relatively persistent the rst effect dominates since policymakers believe
that most of what they perceive to be a negative demand shock in period 
 is going to persist
into period 
 while what they perceive to be a positive cost shock in period 
 is not going
to persist much into period 
  .
11 Hence, in this case monetary policy is more expansionary
than in the full information benchmark and |n￿ and 
 |￿| are positively related (case (i) in the
proposition). But if the reverse is true (cost shocks are relatively more persistent) beliefs about
the cost shock in period 
dominate policy pushing it towards tightening. As a consequence
monetary policy is more restrictive than in the full information benchmark and |n￿ and 
 |￿|
are negatively related (case (ii) of the proposition).
3.2 " 




We turn next to the consequences of mismeasurement of potential output for the output-gap
and ination. The objective is, as in the previous subsection, to analyze the deviations of
outcomes obtained in the presence of the IP from those that arise in its absence. Using (9) and
(10) it is immediate to relate these deviations to the interest rate deviations studied above. This
yields:
|n￿  |n￿  
W
|n￿  |n￿ (22)
|n￿  |n￿  
W
|n￿  |n￿ (23)
where W
|n￿ and W
|n￿ are the values of the output gap and of ination under optimal monetary
policy when information is perfect. These equations show that when the interest rate is below
44 This remark follows directly from the fact that w.4mw  wmw and w.4  	wmw20
(above) its value under perfect information both ination and the output gap are above (below)
their full information values.
The case of over-expansionary monetary policy (case (i) of proposition 1) is consistent with
Orphanides (2000, 2001) empirical results according to which, during the seventies, US
monetary policy was overly expansionary due to an overestimation of potential output and an
associated underestimation of the output gap. Obviously, this underestimation could also have
been due to inefcient forecasting procedures on the part of the Fed. A main message of this
paper is that this effect is present even if monetary policy is ex-ante optimal and forecasting
procedures are as efcient as technically feasible. In normal times during which the change
in potential output is not too far from its mean this effect is likely to be small and short lived.
But when large permanent shocks to potential output occur this effect is likely to be large and
more persistent. This point is discussed in detail in the next section.
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This section describes the solution to the signal extraction, or ltering, problem faced by
policymakers. To clarify the basic mechanisms at work we focus in the text on the particular
(but simpler) case where demand and cost push shocks are equally persistent (  
), which
yields atractableclosed form solution. Adiscussion oftheprocedureforobtaining thesolution
for the case in which the degrees of persistence differ (
  ) ,b a s e do nt h eK a l m a nlter,
is given in Appendix B, where we show that the main qualitative properties of the optimal
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This subsection describes the optimal predictor ofpotential output when demand and cost push
shocks are equally persistent (  
). The conditional expectation of | based on |, |￿| is21
given by (the derivation appears in Appendix B):
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|3￿ is a combined signal that summarizes all the relevant information from period’s 
  
data. Note that it is positively related to that period’s potential output and demand shocks,
and negatively related to that period’s cost shock. As a consequence the optimal predictor
generally responds positively to current, as well as to all past, shocks to demand, and potential
output, and responds negatively to current, as well as to all past cost shocks.
The conditional forecast (24) possesses several key properties. First, since  and  are both
boundedbetweenzeroandone, thecurrentoptimalpredictorispositivelyrelated to thecurrent,
as well as to all past signals. Second, the weight given to a past signal is smaller the further
in the past is that signal. Third, since , when a positive (negative) innovation to current
potential output (|) occurs the potential output  increases (decreases)  	 than
actual potential output. Fourth, the sum of the coefcients in the optimal predictor in (24) is
equal to one. Finally note that although the true value of potential output is contained only in
the signals ￿c|3￿ the optimal predictor also assigns positive weights to the signals 2c|3￿	 The
intuitive reason is that, by allowing a more precise evaluation of the demand shock, | the
utilization of 2c|3￿ facilitates the separation of | from | in the signals ￿c|3￿	
4.2 *	 	
 







The form of the optimal predictor in (24), in conjunction with the fact that all coefcients are
positive and sum to one implies that when a single shock to potential output occurs (say) in
period 
 and persists forever without any further shocks to potential output, policymakers do
not recognize its full impact immediately. Although their forecasting is optimal policymakers
45 This corresponds to the predictor of (the unit root) potential output, w, that minimizes the mean square
forecast error.22
learn about the permanent change in potential output gradually. Initially (in period 
they
adjust their perception of potential output by the fraction 	 In period 
they internalize the
larger fraction       in period 
 they internalize the, even larger, fraction
     and so on. After many periods this fraction tends to 
implying that after a sufciently large number of periods the full size of the shock is ultimately
learned. Thus, equation (24) implies that there is gradual learning about potential output and
that forecast errors are, therefore, on the same side of zero during this process.
Conversely, when a single relatively large shock to one of the cyclical components of demand
occurs it is partially interpreted for some time as a change in potential output. This too
creates ex-post serial correlation in errors of forecast in the output gap and in potential output.
In general two kinds of errors can be made. A change in potential output may be partly
misinterpreted as a cyclical change, or a cyclical change may be partly misinterpreted as a
change in potential output. Both errors tend to create ex-post serial correlation in forecast
errors, but this serial correlation cannot be utilized in real time to improve policy because,
unlike forecast errors of variables which become known with certainty one period after their
realization, potential output of period 
 is not known with certainty even after that period.
As a consequence the forecast error committed in period 
 cannot be used to “correct” future
forecasts of potential output in the same way that errors in the forecast of a variable that is
revealed one period after the formation of that forecast are normally used to update future
forecasts.
13
It can be shown that forecast errors of potential output and the output gap are generally serially
correlated even in the population. The remainder of this subsection establishes this fact more
precisely and identies conditions under which this serial correlation is dominated by the
variability of innovations to potential output. Note rst, from equation (17), that the error in
forecasting the output gap is equal to the negative of the error in forecasting potential output.
Hence, if forecast errors of potential output are serially correlated, so are forecast errors of the
output gap. It is shown in Appendix C that the covariance between two adjacent forecast errors
46 When the true value of the variable that is being forecasted is revealed with certainty with a lag of one
period, as is often assumed, the general principle that forecast errors are serially uncorrelated in the population
applies. This feature has been used extensively to test for the efciency of nancial market. However when, as
is the case here, the true value of the variable that is being forecasted is not revealed with certainty even after the
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      	 (28)
Since, except for the extreme case in which  and  all terms on the right hand
side of equation (27) are positive, errors in forecasting potential output exhibit a positive serial
correlation. This leads to the following
Proposition 2 +  
 	 







Interestingly this proposition is consistent with recent empirical ndings in Orphanides
(2000a). Orphanides utilizes real time data on the perceptions of policymakers about potential
output during the 1970’s and compares those perceptions with current estimates (as of October
1999) of the historical data. Taking the “current” rendition of estimates of potential output as
a proxy for the true values of potential output during the seventies he nds highly persistent
deviations between the current and the real time estimates of the output gap (see his Figure 3
in particular).
4.3   
  	 	   
Examination of equation (27) reveals that this positive serial correlation is generally due
to persistence in both potential output and in the two cyclical components of output. The
following discussion identies conditions on the underlying variances of the innovations to
potential output and to demand and costs under which this serial correlation is due mainly
to shocks to potential output, and conditions under which it is due mainly to shocks to the
cyclical components of output. In particular we will focus on the relative sizes of the variances24
of shocks to potential output and to the cyclical components of output. As a prelude to the
main discussion of those issues we note the following properties of the optimal predictor
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The proof appears in Appendix D. An immediate implication of the Lemma is that, when the
variance, 2
5, of innovations to potential output is relatively small,  is not far from zero and
   and  are not far from one, implying that  in equation (28) is not far from zero. But
inspection of equation (27) reveals that when  and  are not far from zero the coefcients of
2
} and of 2
￿ in equation (27) are nearly zero while (since  is not far from one) the coefcient
of 2
5 is rather large. As 2
5 rises the coefcients of 2
} and of 2




5 goes up its coefcient goes down, it would appear that the effects of an increase
in 2
5 on the size of the contribution of shocks to potential output to the serial correlation in
forecast errors of potential output is ambiguous. Although this ambiguity may apply for values
of 2
5 above a certain threshold, it does not hold for small values of 2
5	 The reason is that, for
small values of 2
5 the size of the derivative of the product
E￿3@￿2V
￿3V2 2
5 with respect to 2
5 is
dominated by the term ￿
￿3V2 which is positive and large relative to all the other components
of this derivative since the denominator in this expression is very small. This observation,
in conjunction with the fact (implied by Remark 2) that the derivative of  with respect to
2
5 is negative, implies that, below some threshold, the lower the variability of innovations
to potential output, the higher the contribution of this variability to the serial correlation in
forecast errors.
Those observations are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3  # 2
5  
$	 	  	 	    
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An implication of the proposition is that when the variability of innovations to potential output
is small the, relatively rare, occurrence of a large shock to potential output will induce a large
and sustained sequence of serially correlated errors. Since the innovation to potential output
is relatively large and since learning is gradual, the shock dominates the learning process for
some time. As a consequence when looking backwards, forecast errors in potential output and
the resulting monetary policy “errors” will be serially correlated. The intuitive reason is that
the shock to potential output is partially interpreted for several periods as a persistent change
in the output gap.
4.4 	   	 

     
Proposition 2 implies that the serial correlation is always present in the population. But it will
be particularly in evidence following the realization of a large change in potential output. The
reason is that, in nite samples, the magnitude of the serial correlation is directly related to
the size of the shock to potential output.
14 This view implies that the economic events of the
seventies can be viewed as having been triggered by a large decrease in potential output about
which policymakers learned gradually but optimally.
The main lessons from these remarks are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 # 2
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47 Cukierman and Meltzer (1982) use this feature to show (in the context of tests of efciency in nancial
markets) that this mechanism will produce serially correlated forecast errors in nite samples even when there is
no serial correlation in the population.26
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The rst part of the proposition corresponds to the retrospectively loose monetary policy of
the seventies identied by Orphanides (2000b, 2001). This retrospective policy error was
triggered by overestimation of potential output and underestimation of the output gap. The
second part of the proposition appears to tt h e“new economy” of the nineties. The large
positive technological shock to potential output during the nineties was initially interpreted
partly as a positive output gap and triggered a policy response that was judged retrospectively
to be overly restrictive.
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This section develops a preliminary quantitative assessment of the effects of imperfect
information using a model of the US economy proposed and estimated by Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999). The model consists of the following two autoregressive equations for








￿|3￿  |3￿  | (30)
where  | and  | are white noise processes. The parameters ￿￿ and the standard
deviations of ination and of output gap innovations are estimated by OLS. Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999, p.208) argue that, despite its simplicity, this model provides a description of
the US economy which, from the perspective of monetary policy, conforms with the received
wisdom encapsulated in the MPS model, “which was used regularly in the Federal Reserve’s
forecasting process over 25 years.”
15
48 The estimated coefcients in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) are: 
4  
 5  	 4  

5   6   7   

  (the units are annual percent values for ination and
percentage points for the output gap variable).27
Our objective here is to analyze the consequences of a non-observable potential output level.
Recall that we dene the output gap as the percentage difference between actual and potential
output |  |  |. Wepostulatethat equation (30) originates fromtheoutput equation| 
2
￿’￿ ￿|3￿ |3￿  |  | and from the potential output equation | 
2
￿’￿ ￿|3￿  |.
This formulation implies that, as in the main body of the paper, potential output shocks  | do
not affect the output gap (as they shift actual and potential output in the same way). Therefore
they should not be stabilized by the policy maker. An information problem exists, however, as
potential output and cyclical shocks to demand and ination cannot be observed separately.
We follow Rudebusch and Svensson by assuming that the policy maker aims at minimizing an
intertemporal loss function |  
"
￿’f 
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and adopt their basic parametrization in setting  and !  		 The last term reects the
well documented tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates in small steps. Imperfect
information enters the policy problem through our assumption that period’s 
 information set,
|3￿ includes only observations on actual output and ination up to and including period 

and no direct observations on either past or current levels of potential output. As discussed in




￿ are key in determining the outcomes
of the ltering problem. The experiments below utilize the values estimated by Rudebusch
and Svensson (1999), respectively ￿  	 and }  	 (annual percent values for
ination and percentage points for the output gap). As to the innovations in potential output,
we experimented with values ranging from “small” (5  	)t o“large” (5  	). As
implied by Proposition 3, following the realization of an isolated shock to potential output,
the forecast errors in potential output are larger and more persistent in the former case (small
5). This case, which is discussed below, provides the most favourable setting for potential
output shocks to create large and persistent “policy errors”. The reason is that, in this case, the28
signal about potential output in observable data is already so small that the forecast of potential
output is largely insensitive to new information and is, therefore, nearly a constant.
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Figure 2 - Effects of imperfect information following a negative potential output shock
Figure 2 reports the deviations between the paths of fourmain macro variables underimperfect
and under perfect information following a 1 percentage point reduction in potential output.
The upper box in the gure shows that the policy maker’s forecast error of the output gap is
initially very large (almost none of the shock is predicted) and highly persistent (it takes about
four years to return near zero). The interest rate is lower than under full information, as almost
all of the output reduction is perceived as a cyclical shock. As a consequence, both output and
ination are above their full information counterpart (lower box of the gure).
A back-of-the envelope calculation can be used to gauge the economic signicance of the
magnitudes predicted by our model. The revisions in the estimates of potential output for the
seventies reported in Figure 1 suggest that forecast errors in the output gap are in the range of
4 to 7 percent of output (for the year 1976). Somewhat larger magnitudes are suggested by
Orphanides’s(2000, Figure3)measuresoftheforecasterrorsintheoutputgapforthe1970s. If
wechooseabenchmarkvalueofabout5percentfortheerrorintheoutputgap, wehavetoscale
49 As a consequence further reductions in } do not lead to noticeable changes in the effects of imperfect
information.29
alltheeffectsinFigure2upbyafactorof5. Thisimpliesthattheinterestrateunderincomplete
information is more than ve percentage points below its full information counterpart during
the year following the shock. This calculation also indicates that ination and the output gap
record maximum deviations of about 2 and 3.5 percentage points from their full information
benchmarks respectively. While those numbers are economically signicant, indicating that
imperfect information might contribute to explain the higher than average ination recorded
in the mid seventies, they admittedly only go part of the way, leaving a signicant part of that
inationary burst to be explained by other factors. Three potential candidates are the direct
inationary impact of the oil shocks, inefcient use of real time information and/or inefcient
implementation of monetary policy.
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Taken literally, the previous analysis implies that, other things remaining the same and except
forthesign ofpolicyerrors, theseventiesandtheninetiesaresimilar. In theseventiesmonetary
policy was too loose in comparison to a perfect information benchmark because potential
output was overestimated and in the nineties it was overly restrictive because, at least initially,
potential output was underestimated. But other things did not remain the same between those
two periods. In particular, there is reason to believe that at least two other things changed
between the seventies and the nineties.
First the relative emphasis of policy on price stabilization versus output stabilization shifted
towards the former. In terms of our model this means that the parameter  decreased between
the seventies and the nineties implying, via equation (8), that the response of the interest rate
to cost shocks in the nineties was stronger than in the seventies. Arguments and evidence
presented in Taylor (1998), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) and Siklos (2002, pp. 61-64)
support this view. Second, it is likely that during the seventies policymakers were overly
optimistic about their ability to forecast potential output and the natural level of employment.
The view that potential output is rather difcult to predict became accepted mainly during the
nineties, as illustrated,  	, by the work of Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997a, 1997b). In
what follows we use the analytical framework of the paper to investigate the consequences of
those two changes for the comparison between the seventies and the nineties.30
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Proposition 1 implies that, provided 
 
2  
2, overestimation of potential output
(
 |￿|   leads to real rates that appear, with the benet of hindsight, to have been too low.
Assuming that this condition was satised during the seventies, it follows that, for a given
absolute value of the forecast error ( 
 |￿|  the absolute deviation of the interest rate from its
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Thepropositionimplies that even ifthestandarddeviation oftheshocks topotential outputwas
similar during the seventies and during the nineties, policy errors should prove to have been
smallerin thesecondperiod. Theintuitivereasonisthattheincreasedfocus onthestabilization
of ination between the two periods reduced the divergence between optimal policy under
imperfect and under full information about potential output and about the cyclical shocks, |
and |	 The discussion in Taylor (1998) and casual observation appear to be consistent with
this implication of the analysis. More generally the analysis suggests that, in the presence of
uncertainty about potential output, central bank conservativeness affects the economy not only
directly (as in Rogoff (1985) or Walsh (1995)) but also through the signal extraction problem
solved by policymakers.
6.2 " 
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We embed the notion that during the seventies policymakers were overoptimistic about
potential output uncertainty into the analysis by postulating that during the seventies the
perceived variance, 2
5R of the innovation to potential output was lower than the true variance,
2
5, but that during the nineties the perceived variance adjusted upwards and became equal
to the true variance. For the rest, we maintain the hypothesis that the stochastic processes
generating potential output and the cyclical shocks remained the same over the entire period,31
and that, given the perceived variance in each period, policymakers used optimal lters
and chose policy so as to minimize expected losses. This is a stylized way to isolate the
consequences of overcondence about estimates of potential output during the seventies. An
immediate consequence of these presumptions is that the mean square error in forecasting
potential output during the seventies was larger than the optimal mean square error.
17 By
contrast, during the nineties those two forecast errors were equal.
Before continuing we digress to the following proposition
Proposition 6 )     
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The proof is obtained by differentiating the parameters  and  in equation (24) with respect
to 2
5, by showing that  is a decreasing function of 2
5 and that  is an increasing function of
2
5 and by noting that the sum of the weights on the combined signal is equal to one for ((
values of 2
5.
Together with the presumption that during the seventies 2
5R  2
5 while during the nineties
2
5R  2
5 the proposition implies that, in addition to being more accurate on average, learning
about changes in potential output during the nineties was quicker than in the seventies. On
this view monetary policy during the nineties was nearer to its full information optimal value
in comparison to the seventies thanks in part to a swifter and more accurate recognition of
changes in potential output.
7 (! "$ %8
This paper provides a unied explanation to account for part of the ination of the seventies
and for part of the remarkable price stability of the nineties. This is accomplished by showing
that, even if monetary policy is optimal and forecasts of potential output are efcient, large
permanent changes in potential output trigger excessively loose monetary policy when those
changes are negative and excessively tight policy when the changes are positive. But the paper
also shows that even if the positive shocks to potential output during the nineties were similar
4: This is a direct consequence of the presumption that, although they used the correct form for the predictor,
policymakers during the seventies fed this predictor with the lower perceived variance, 5
}s rather than with the
actual variance, 5
}32
in absolute value to the negative shocks of the seventies, there is reason to believe that policy
wasexcessivelylooseintheseventiestoagreaterextentthanitwasexcessivelytight duringthe
nineties. This conclusion is based on two assumptions. The r s ti st h a tt h eF e dw a sr e l a t i v e l y
more conservative in the Rogoff (1985) sense in the nineties than in the seventies given the
economic structure postulated in the paper, a higher degree of conservativeness reduces the
difference between the imperfect and the full information policy at any given level of the error
in forecasting potential output. The second is that a more realistic evaluation of uncertainties
surrounding potential output enabled the Fed to learn faster and more accurately about changes
in potential output during the nineties than during the seventies, so that its policy was nearer
to the full information benchmark.
The framework of the paper also leads to two wider conclusions that are likely to transcend
the particular model used to illustrate them. The rst is that even if monetary policy is
chosen optimally and even if, given the stochastic structure of shocks, available information
is used as efciently as possible, retrospective policy errors are unavoidable. During periods
in which changes in potential output are moderate these errors are neither very important, nor
persistent. As a consequence, they do not draw much attention ex-post. But during periods
following large sustained changes in potential output, retrospective policy errors appear, with
the benet of hindsight, to be substantial and serially correlated. This makes them noticeable
and draws public attention. Thus, even central banks that forecast and behave optimally may
sometimes be judged retrospectively as having committed serious policy errors. But, since
they hadbehavedefcientlyatthetime,itdoesnotfollowthat (giventheinformationstructure)
such errors can be avoided in the future. This mechanism is quantitatively more important the
smaller the relative size of the variance of innovations to potential output.
Obviously, this does not necessarily mean that policy and forecasting procedures during the
s e v e n t i e sw e r ea se f cient as possible at the time. The point, however, is that the ex-post
identication of policy errors is not sufcient to conclude that such errors were avoidable in
real time. A challenge facing policymakers andeconomistsistodistinguishbetween avoidable
(in real time) and unavoidable policy errors. We believe that a model like the one proposed
here, where policy is consistent with the economic structure and information is processed
efciently, can pave the way towards a solution.33
The second conclusion is that, with the exception of extreme cases, the fact that in the
wake of large and sustained changes in potential output policymakers commit serious errors
in forecasting potential output does not imply that noisy but optimally devised forecasts of
potential output should not be used as indicator variables for monetary policy.
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which yields the following output and ination outcomes:
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At time 
 the policy maker’s problem is to estimate | based on |c i.e. using all the
information contained in the observed sequence of signals ￿c|3￿ and 2c|3￿ (  			). To
this end, it is convenient to dene the new signal ￿c|3￿  ￿c|3￿ 2c|3￿. Let us write the linear










where ￿  |  | and ￿c|  |  |
and the last line follows immediately from (12) and (13). We seek to determine optimal
weights ￿ and "￿ that minimize the mean square forecast error of the | predictor (it follows
from this property that the predictor W
| equals the expectation of | conditional on | i.e. |￿|).
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Note that the two rst order conditions (FOC) have an identical rst term inside the curly
bracket and a similar form for the term in the second curly bracket, which only differ in that 
(￿) is replaced by 
 ("￿. Leading (37) by one step, multiplying the resulting expression by 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where both (42) and (43) hold for   			. These two equations constitute a system of
two homogenous linear second order difference equations in the unknowns ￿ and "￿.W en e x t
solve the simpler case in which   
 and then present the general solution.
The case of equally persistent demand and cost-push shocks
When   
 the difference equations (42) and (43) can be uncoupled. It is immediate to see







for   			 (44)
where the equality for  is established from the rst order conditions for f and "f (not
reported). Substituting the expression for the generic "￿ into (42) yields


















Equation (45) has one non-explosive solution which is given by
￿  ￿
￿3￿ for   			 (46)
where ￿ is a constant term to be determined and  is the “stable” root (i.e. smaller than one)
of the second order equation in : 2(from 45). The values of f and of ￿ remain to
be determined. Using the rst order conditions for f and ￿ (where the latter is obtained from
(37)for  )thefollowinglinear relationisestablished(aftersomealgebraictransformations
of identical nature to those used to establish (42)):
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A second linear relation between f and ￿ is established after analogous algebraic
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The solutions for f and ￿ are determined by the system: (47), (48). The value for f is
reported in the main text. Using (44), (46) and the expression for the optimal predictor (35)




























































 suggesting the convenient reformulation






























	 Since   
￿
￿    this implies 
￿
￿      used in
(24) in the main text.
Solution for the general case (  
)u s i n gt h eK a l m a nlter
When   
 the second-order difference equations system given by (42) and (43) can not
be uncoupled and computing a closed-form analytical solution for the optimal lter is more
involved. In the following we solve the ltering problem by applying the Kalman lter. We
begin by rewriting the system of equations (3), (4) and (5) in matrix form as

























and where '|n￿ is a vector of iid innovation with unit variance. The system in equation (50) is



















Equation (52) is the measurement equation of the Kalman lter for our system. A general
specication of the state and measurement equations is given by equation (8.1) in chapter 8 of
Hansen and Sargent (1997). Equations (50) and (52) correspond, for our system, to equation
(8.1) of that chapter.
18 Algebraic manipulation of equations (8.8) and (8.9) in conjunction with
equation (8.11) of that chapter imply that, for the case in which the covariance matrix  of the
one-step ahead forecast error in the state variables (i.e. | |￿|3￿) has converged, the optimal
forecasts of the hidden states in | given the information set | are given by


















Equation (56) implicitly determines the unknown matrix,  and given  equation (55)
determines )	 Equation (54) can be rewritten as
|￿|     )(|￿|3￿  )|	 (57)
4; Since there is no measurement error in our system the variance - covariance matrix of the noise in the measurement
equation is identically zero. There is nonetheless a meaningful signal extraction problem because there are only two signals
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Lagging (57) by one period and using |n￿￿|  %|￿|, repeated substitution of the resulting
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and *￿ is the +  





￿2 the rst and second elements in the rst row of *￿) and using equation (58), the
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Solving for the optimal lter numerically using Matlab reveals that the key properties of the
predictor that were established analytically in the case   
 a r ep r e s e r v e di nt h em o r eg e n e r a l
case. Table B1 reports the benchmark parametrization of one such example. Since a key
variableinthesignal extractionprocessistherelativesizeoftheinnovationstopotential output
versus those in  and  we let the standard deviation of potential output 5 vary between .01
a n d. 3t os h o wh o wt h ep r o p e r t i e so ft h eo p t i m a llter vary as the signal to noise ratio in the
fundamentals changes.41







￿￿ are decreasing in +, i.e. the weight attributed to the observable | gets smaller
as | gets older. The gure below plots the coefcients -
￿
￿￿ for the rst six lags (+  		)
computed from the optimal lter for four different values of 5 (ranging from relatively small,
5  	, to relatively large, 5  	).


















￿￿ on Observables for +  			
The decreasing prole of each of the four curves in the gure indicates that the value of the
information contained in the observable, |decreases as that observation ages. Themagnitude
of the innovation in  , 5 relative to the size of the other innovations in the system (￿ and
}) is a key determinant of the speed at which the value of information “depreciates”. As this
relative volatility increases, the observables contain a better signal about  and the value of
past observation therefore diminishes. This is apparent from the gure where, as 5 increases,
the weight on the current signal grows (from around 0.1 to above 0.9 in our example) since
the sum of all the -
￿
￿￿ w e i g h t si s1 ,a ni n c r e a s ei n-f
￿￿implies that the sum of the remaining
coefcients, i.e. the weight attached to past observables, decreases as 5 increases.
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Rewriting the optimal predictor in equation (24) as |￿|  "
￿’f/￿|3￿ where /f   and
/￿      ￿3￿ for  	 , substituting this form of the predictor into the expression
for the forecast error in equation (16) and regrouping terms so as to express this error in terms
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(64)
Using the denition of the /￿
￿ and factoring out identical innovations we obtain after some
algebra
0|     |3￿    |32   
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where       	 Since it is a sum of innovations, the expected value of 
 |￿| is zero.
Since all the innovations are mutually and serially uncorrelated, the covariance between two

























0| in the rst equation in (65) by one period, multiplying by the expression for 0| and taking
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5	 (67)
Lagging (| in the second equation in (65) by one period, multiplying the resulting expression
by the expression for (| and taking the expected value we obtain after some algebra
 (|	(|3￿

   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2    





Since  1|	1|3￿ has the same form in  | and 



















Equation (27) in the text is obtained by substituting equations (67) through (69) into equation
(66).
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involved and is not reported here for reason of space. We computed it using Mathematica,
and veried that its value is positive for   positive standard deviations and 
2  
(excluding extreme cases in which at least of the variances is zero, those conditions are always
satised. More details on this computation are available from the authors upon request). When
both ratios of variances tend to in equation (24) tends to zero implying, by inspection of
the expression for  that  tends to zero as well. When both ratios tend to innity, so does
	 To show that when both ratios of variances tend to innity  tends to one, divide both the
numerator and the denominator in the expression for  by  and take the limit as  goes to
innity.

















Inspection of the expressions for  and  shows that YV
Y￿   and YA
YEj2
5*j2
}￿  	 The derivative




E￿n>A￿2 which is positive for 	 It follows that  is a
decreasing function of 2
52
}	 When both variance ratios tend to zero so does  implying that
 tends to  and, therefore, that  tends to one. The proof for 2
52
￿ is analogous.*
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